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We examine the pathways by which gender inequality affects fertility and hampers growth. 
We introduce several dimensions of gender inequality into a 2-sex OLG model with a non-
unitary representation of household decision-making. We characterize a Malthusian corner 
regime which is characterized by strong gender inequality in education and high fertility. 
We find both in theory and in the data that reducing the social and institutional gender gap 
does  not  help  to  escape  from  this  regime  while  reducing  the  wage  gender  gap  lowers 
fertility only in countries which have already escaped from it. The key policies to ease out 
the countries in the Malthusian regime are to promote mother's longevity and to curb infant 
mortality. In the interior regime, parents consider the impact of their children education on 
the expected intra-household bargaining position in their  future  couple. Education could 
thus compensate against the institutional and social gender gap that still exists in developed 
countries. 
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The drop of fertility close to - or below - replacement level has accompanied all developed
countries along the transition from economic stagnation to sustained growth. Many
least developed countries have now started their demographic transition and fertility is
sharply decreasing there too. Still a group of countries seems not to have started its
demographic transition yet with the regions of Sub-Saharian Africa and South Asia pre-
eminently represented in this group of countries. Alongside high fertility, these countries
are also characterized by gender inequality in education with women enjoying lower levels
of schooling than men.1
Apart from being valuable on its own, a range of socio-economic virtues are widely
attached to gender equality which includes improved children’s development (through
better health and education), reduced poverty and the promotion of long-term economic
growth. In attest to the positive link between the status of women in a country and
its economic development, programs aiming at the promotion of gender equality have
emerged. Two emblematic examples are the World Bank’s “Gender Action Plan as
smart economics” and the United Nations that explicitly settles the promotion of gender
equality and women empowerment as its third Millennium Development Goal.
Discernibly is gender equality a multi-dimensional concept that encompasses many other
aspects than the sole access to education. Any comprehensive measure of gender parity in
a society should indeed bear on a range of indicators capturing such features as women’s
access to economic resources, women’s access to health programs, women’s legal rights
and civil liberties and so forth. In adequacy of this mindset, the World Economic Forum
has implemented the Global Gender Gap (GGG) index that provides a concise measure
of gender equality for a list of 128 countries. This index sums up a large variety of
gender-based inequality indicators along four main dimensions: “Economic participation
and opportunity”, “educational attainment”, “political empowerment” and, “health and
survival”.2
The usefulness of embracing multiple dimensions when considering the issue of gender
equality is best disclosed by comparing the four GGG subindex scores of speciﬁc coun-
tries; for example, scores of Iran and Mozambique are displayed in Table 1.3 Despite
1See United Nations Statistics Division’s country data release on total fertility rates and education
indicators for women and men accessible via http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm.
2See the Global Gender Gap Report (2007). An alternative to this index of gender disparity is the
very rich “Gender, Institutions and Development Database” from the OECD.
3Subindex scores are comprised between 0 (inequality) and 1 (equality). The index is built from
female-to-male ratios in order to capture the gender gaps independently of the absolute women’s and
1being relatively more egalitarian in the educational attainment dimension, Iran per-
forms lower scores than Mozambique in terms of women’s political empowerment and
women’s economic participation and opportunity. In addition, reporting the number of
birth per women positively serves to illustrate the above-mentioned negative relationship
between fertility and an educational gender gap unfavorable to women. Observe that
Iran, where gender parity is near to be reached in education only, has a number of birth
per women of only 2.03. Contrastingly, Mozambique combines a educational attainment
female-to-male ratio well below unity with a high number of birth per woman, but gives
more political and economic power to women compared to Iran. This observation raises
the question of the relative pertinence of the various gender equality concepts when
considering the issue of the economic development process.
Table 1: The Global Gender Gap index 2007: Iran and Mozambique
Educational Political Economic Birth per
Attainment Empowerment Opportunity Woman∗
Iran 0.96 0.03 0.40 2.07
Mozambique 0.75 0.23 0.80 5.30
Sources: The Global Gender Gap Report 2007, World Economic Forum. ∗World
Development Indicators, the World Bank Group, 2005.
Broader evidence for the negative link between female’s access to education and fertility
is suggested from a cross country data analysis. Figure 1 depicts the gender gap scores
for the educational attainment GGG subindex together with the total fertility rate for
a list of 128 countries. The coeﬃcient of correlation between the two variables is equal
to -0,76 (signiﬁcant at the 0.005 probability level).
In this paper, we want to formally clarify the role of various dimensions to gender in-
equality in fostering the transition toward faster growth. Acknowledging the enhancing
eﬀect of a reduced population growth in the shift from economic stagnation to sustained
growth, we especially want to examine the pathways by which increases in gender equal-
ity may aﬀect fertility. We do so by means of a household bargaining model in which
we explicitly distinguish between the following gender-based gaps: the survival gap, the
wage gap, the social and institutional gap and the educational gap. The latter is en-
dogenous to our analysis while the former three gender-based concepts are exogenous.
men’s attainment levels which would not be independent of the level of available resources. This make
the inter-country comparison possible regardless of their general level of development.





















































Figure 1: Female-to-Male Education and Fertility: Cross-Country Plot.
Speciﬁcally, we integrate a collective representation of household decision-making into
a two-sex overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility and parental invest-
ment in children’s human capital.4 In this model, agents from both sexes are assumed to
be perfectly identical except in their time constraint as women bear a higher time cost
of childrearing. Fully abstracting from allegedly socially ascribed gender roles, this as-
sumption is grounded on the inherent biological diﬀerences between genders that entail
a higher time commitment to child care for women associated to pregnancy, childbirth
and breastfeeding.5
In addition, parents care for the wellbeing of their children without favoring boys or girls
a priori. A distinctive feature of the model comes with our speciﬁcation of household
4Initiated by Chiappori (1988,1992), collective models of household behavior emerged in response
to the lack of both theoretical foundation and empirical support for the unitary - or “head of the
household” - representation of family decision-making. See Chiappori and Donni (2006) for a survey of
the literature on non-unitary models of household behaviors.
5Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) provide evidence for the time cost associated with breastfeeding.
Combining information from the National Association of Pediatrics charts on the number of daily
feedings by age of the infant with an estimated duration of 20 to 30 minutes for each feeding, the
authors evaluate that a women spend on average 13.6 to 17.3 hours per week breast-feeding the infant.
Based on this analysis, they conclude that on average, a women spend up to 43% of their working time
nursing, given an average workweek of 40 hours during the ﬁrst 12 months of life of the child.
3decision-making. It is based on the notion of intra-household bargaining power: pursuant
to the collective household model, the welfare function of the couple is represented
as a weighted sum of individual utilities where the weights can be interpreted as the
bargaining power of the spouses in the decision process. We assume these weights to
depend on the earning abilities of the spouses and, in particular, on the spouses’s relative
human capital levels. Altruistic parents make decisions on individual consumption levels,
fertility, and the education of their children. Hence, parents face an inter-temporal
arbitrage problem that involves decisions on consumption across generations with the
double peculiarity of a quality-quantity tradeoﬀ with respect to the oﬀspring and a
gender power variable that evolves over time. As in the standard model of parental
investment in children’s human capital, our model predicts that parents invest less,
ceteris paribus, in the education of their daughters because of the lower amount of time
devoted to labor market activities by women that reduces the returns to girls’ education
relative to that of boys.6 However, an additional consideration enters this investment
decision as parents recognize that the equilibrium share their children, as adult, will
extract from the household decision is linked to the human capital they have been
endowed with and this may aﬀect the direction of the gender gap in education.
In spite of the relatively abundant empirical literature on the impact of gender inequality
for economic growth (see e.g. Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen, 2002), macroeconomic stud-
ies that formally explore the role of gender heterogeneity remain relatively sparse.7 Ex-
amples of dynamic models with endogenous fertility that explicitly embody non-unitary
model of household behavior are Echevarria and Merlo (1999), and Iyigun and Walsh
(2007). In both works, prior gender asymmetries are limited to biological disparities
and gender diﬀerences in education is the equilibrium outcome of intra-household bar-
gaining. However, since growth is left exogenous in both models, the authors don’t use
their model to investigate how these gender disparities may aﬀect the long-run pattern
of economic development. Echevarria and Merlo are interested in deriving a measure
of the cost of having children that they estimate in a cross-country analysis. In Iyigun
and Walsh, education is not chosen by parents but is seen as a pre-marital strategic
investment decision that an agent make taking into account its implication in terms of
future intra-household allocation of resources.
By relating the evolution of gender discrimination in education to long-run economic
and demographic development in Europe, the work of Lagerl¨ of (2003a,2003b) borders
6See, for instance, Becker (1991) and Davies and Zhang (1995).
7Here, we want to refer in particular to dynamic model with gender discrimination that does not
result from supposed asymmetries in terms of preferences or abilities.
4on our research program. The author develops a 2-sex dynamic model with endogenous
fertility and household formation. Without assuming gender asymmetries in preferences
and abilities, diﬀerences in parental investment in human capital between boys and girls
may arise as a Nash equilibrium of a coordination game between families: when all
other families discriminate, it is optimal for an atomistic parent to act the same. The
author assumes that economies re-coordinate on more gender-equal equilibria over time
without analyzing the driving forces toward higher gender equality. In addition, although
integrating gender variables, the model builds on the unitary approach of the family. In
that sense, the model does not response to the call for multi-person representations of the
household. As the author notes, the model captures the concept of gender stereotypes
but in regards with the above remark it does not capture the notion of gender decisional
empowerment.
The present work also relates to the contribution of Doepke and Tertilt (2007) that
explicitly addresses the issue of the change in women’s status along the development
process. Their work diﬀers from existing literature in its angle of inquiry as the authors
look at the other direction of causality in the relationship between women’s empower-
ment and economic development. That is, they examine what economic force may have
induce the progressive extension in women’s rights during the industrialization process.
They propose an OLG model with a quality-quantity trade-oﬀ on children and some
political process to explain the distribution of power between men and women. Relying
on the assumption of higher male physical strength, political power in this economy is
initially concentrated in the hands of men. However, ongoing technological progress that
augments the return to human capital may induce men to give in rights to women as this
will allow for higher quality children and faster economic growth. We do not look at the
political process through which advances in technology lead to women’s empowerment.
We rather direct the focus on the reversal causality direction, the speciﬁc question at
hand here can be summarized in the following terms: What and how changes in gender
disparities intervene in shaping the development process with a special emphasis on the
demographic transition?
By introducing several dimensions of gender inequality into a 2-sex OLG model that
encompasses a non-unitary representation of household decision-making, we are able
to characterize a Malthusian corner regime in addition to the interior growth regime.
The low growth Malthusian equilibrium is characterized by strong gender inequality
in education and high fertility. The model displays this low-type equilibrium without
need to assume non-convexities in the returns to human capital as it is generally the
case in human capital-driven growth models built on the mode of Becker, Murphy and
5Tamura (1990). Indeed, while these authors required this assumption in order to produce
the inferior equilibrium, the sole introduction in our set-up of gender heterogeneity in
parental time requirements suﬃces to induce a motive for discrimination in the head of
the parents and thereupon admitting a Malthusian equilibrium.
We also derive the model’s implications in terms of the impact of the various dimension
in gender disparity in shaping the economic development process. In particular, we
show that reducing the social and institutional gender gap in economies trapped in the
Malthusian regime does not help escaping it. Reducing the wage gender gap does not
help either. The key policy measures which most likely will ease out these countries
are to promote mother’s health and longevity and to curb infant mortality. As we
will argue when discussing the results, these facts are not inconsistent with empirical
existing ﬁndings. In addition, we ﬁnd both in theory and in the data that reducing the
wage gender gap lowers fertility only in countries which have already escaped from the
Malthusian regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the model and
outlines some broad implications of the bearing of the intra-household allocation process.
Section 2 describes the Malthusian equilibrium with high fertility and gender disparities
in education. It also discusses the condition on the diﬀerent gender gaps to escape this
low level equilibrium. The modern growth BGP is in turn presented in Section 3 and
discusses the implication of the assumption of endogenous gender power. In section 4,
we confront the testable implications of the model to empirical evidence. Section 5
concludes.
1 The Model
We assume an overlapping-generations model in which individuals are either males or
females and live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. Men and women are assumed
to be perfectly identical except for the biologically founded diﬀerence of a longer child
rearing time supplied by women. In the ﬁrst period of life, children simply accumulate
human capital and their consumption level is set equal to zero. At the beginning of
adulthood, men and women are randomly matched into married couples. Adults are
altruistic as they care for the well being of their children. Subject to the household
resource constraint, married couples make decision on the spouses’s consumption level,
the number of children and the amount of education spending on daughters and sons.
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t is the consumption level, the function b(nt) characterizes the degree of altruism
toward children following Barro and Becker (1988). nt is the number of children, half
of whom are girls, and half are boys. That is, if single, individuals don’t have children
and only derive utility from consumption while, if married, individuals have preferences
over consumption, the number of children, and the utility of their children. Notice that
weights are attached to the welfare of daughters and sons via the variable θt+1. This
variable is an agglomerate that captures both “social norms” toward gender equality and
some balance of power measure grounded on the distribution of human capital between
men and women.
The time endowment of an adult individual is pi
t. We allow this parameter to be gender
speciﬁc in order to examine the impact of life expectancy diﬀerentials between men
and women on the intra-household resource allocation and on economic dynamics. Men
inelastically supply their time endowment to the labor market. Women are constrained
in their amount of time to devote to the labor market as they are assumed to provide
the whole time requirement associated with child rearing. With φ representing the
ﬁxed time cost per child, women are left with p
f
t − φnt units of time to supply to the
labor market. Labor earnings of an individual i depend on the current wage rate, wi
t,
and on her productivity as measured by her stock of human capital, hi
t. The latter
variable results from the parental decision on education expenditures. Thereof, men’s










In the following, we assume that all individuals enter marriage. In order to capture
the multi-person dimension of the household, its welfare function is represented by a

















The welfare weight θt, θt ∈ [0,1]∀t, can be interpreted as the bargaining power of the
8Allowing for gender-speciﬁc wage rates is consistent with the well documented persistence of a
gender wage gap in competitive labor markets even when controlling for hours of work, labor market
sectors or human capital characteristics. There exists a literature showing that unequal treatments in
pay may arise as a coordination equilibrium between ﬁrms in competitive labor markets even under the
assumption of women and men being perfectly identical ex ante, see Francois (1998) and Francois and
Van Ours (2000).
7husband in the household decision process. Notice that in Equation (1), parents evaluate
the welfare of their children through the lens of their expected bargaining positions in
their future couple.
The welfare weight θt is assumed to be a function of the human capital stock of the
spouses with the speciﬁc representation:
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with γ, γ ∈ [0,1]. This parameter measures the preponderance of human capital on the
bargaining power distribution.9 When γ equals zero, bargaining power is exogenous and
equal to ¯ θ ∈ [0,1]. The ratio on the right-hand side of the above expression describes
how human capital aﬀects bargaining power with the parameter   ≥ 0 describing the
sensitivity of the function to relative human capital. The part of bargaining power
associated to human capital of agent i is equal to 1/2 if   = 0, while as   → ∞, this
dimension of bargaining power approaches unity for agent i as soon as the human capital




t denote the amounts of education parents provide to daughters and sons at





Assuming income pooling, and denoting income net of education spending by yt, the





























In accordance with the presumption of men and women having identical abilities, we








with δ, the human capital elasticity with respect to education, and ¯ ht, the average level
of human capital in the parents’s generation. It captures a positive intergenerational
externality in the process of human capital accumulation. According to this production
9The speciﬁcation of individual human capital as a determinant of intra-household decision power is
consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings. L¨ uhrmann and Maurer (2007) ﬁnd that education is associated
with more individual decision power in the couple. In the same line, and Friedberg and Webb (2006)
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of skill on bargaining power, measured by education and occupation, raises own and
reduces spouse’s relative decision power.
10Our representation of bargaining power shares with the contest success function the ratio functional
representation (Skaperdas, 1996)
8function, a gender gap in human capital can solely arise from a parental bias in the
education expenditure decision towards children of a speciﬁc gender group.
In what follows, we make additional assumptions on functional forms: we choose a
CRRA speciﬁcation with parameter σ for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and,
for the degree of parental altruism, we adopt the functional constant elasticity form
b(nt) = βn
−ǫ
t with β ∈ [0,1] denoting the psychological discount factor, and ǫ ∈ [0,1]
representing the elasticity of altruism with respect to the number of children. It is such
that for given utility per pair of children (V
f
t+1 + V m
t+1)/2, parental utility increases at
a diminishing rate with the number of children nt. In order to have a positive number
of children we need the following parametric restriction (see Barro and Becker 1988 and
1989):
Assumption 1. σ > ǫ.
This requires that the exponent of consumption 1−σ is smaller than the one associated
to children, 1 − ǫ, otherwise households always prefer consumption to having children.




















































t ≥ 0, e
m
t ≥ 0. (7)
The tilde variables in the objective function, ˜ h
f
t+1 and ˜ hm
t+1, represent the stock of human
capital of the children’s future wife and husband, respectively. These are taken as given
as they result from the parental human capital investment choice of the children’s future
spouses. Hence, the decision on children’s education by parents conﬁgures a strategic
game played among families: When choosing the amount of education expenditures on
children, parents need to solve the intra-household allocation problem their children
will encounter as adults recognizing that both the total amount of resources to bargain
over and the relative bargaining power of their own children will also be functions of
the human capital of the children’s spouses. Therefore, education on own children by a
couple of parents is a best-response to the other parents’s education decision on children.
9Anticipating on an after-speciﬁed result, note that in equilibrium all households behave
in an identical manner so that perfect homogeneity within gender groups holds in every
period and the issue of assortative mating does not come into the play.
Let us now look at the ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem, which will allow
us to identify some properties of the solution.
Consumption
The optimality condition with respect to spousal consumption is such that the consump-








and, combined with the budget constraint, we obtain the individual consumption levels,
c
m
t = Θtyt, (8)
c
f
t = (1 − Θt)yt,







t + (1 − θt)1/σ
. (9)
Beside the relative spousal bargaining powers, θt and 1−θt, the coeﬃcient of risk aversion
σ also aﬀects the ﬁnal intra-household distribution of resources. When the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion is high, the ﬁnal distribution is less sensitive to any imbalance between the







and the distribution of consumption between the spouses is perfectly equalized whatever
the level of θt. A conversely low coeﬃcient of risk aversion renders the distribution of
consumption very sensitive to an unbalanced distribution of spousal bargaining powers.
Our model implies complete compensation by the husband for the wife’s labor income
loss due to the presence of children in the household. Each spouse receives a fraction
of the total household labor earnings and contributes for the very same fraction to the
10education expenditures. When γ = 0 and θt = ¯ θ = 1/2, both spouses get exactly half of
the household resources over and above education expenditures.
Education




















































































At an interior solution, the above optimality conditions hold as equalities. The left-
hand side in (10)-(11) represents the cost of an additional unit of education while the
right-hand side is the associated marginal beneﬁt. As in the standard model of parental
investment in children’s human capital, the higher the marginal productivity or “earn-
ing ability” of the son (daughter), the higher the marginal utility for the parent from
investing in their son’s (daughter’s) education. This is captured by the utter right terms
of (12) and (13). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side instead captures the additional
eﬀect of the impact of the education decision on the next generation’s distribution of
bargaining power. Indeed, within this framework, parental decisions on investment in
human capital of sons and daughters will tilt the intra-household allocation of their
children’s future couple.
Given the assumption of diminishing returns to education in the human capital accumu-
lation function, a higher fertility further decreases the amount of education spending on
girls relative to that on boys, all else being equal. In addition, parents increase the human
capital of their daughter (son) in response to an increase in the husband’s (wife’s) stock
of human capital. This results from the speciﬁcation on the intra-household allocation
process.
In the strategic game played by families of choosing own children’s human capital given
11that of children in other families, parents simultaneously face a perfectly symmetric
decision problem resulting in best response functions (10) and (11). At equilibrium, all





t and ˜ hm
t = hm
t in a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As a result, the


































































with strict equality at an interior solution. The left-hand side represents the marginal
gain for parents from an additional pair of children while the right-hand side corresponds
to the eﬀect on utility associated to children in terms of forgone individual consumption
for given quality of the children. It includes both the direct education cost and the
opportunity cost in terms of lost earnings for the mother.
Let us conclude the presentation of the model by highlighting the diﬀerent concepts of
gender inequality embedded in it. Three of them are exogenous: we deﬁne the survival
gap by the ratio of total time endowments, pm/pf. Secondly, the wage gap is mea-
sured by wm/wf. The last exogenous indicator is our so-called social and institutional
gap enclosed in the parameter ¯ θ. This concept captures the societal and institutional
propensity of a country toward higher gender equality (think of it as a compound indi-
cator enclosing a wide set of elements ranging from family norms and codes, physical
integrity, civil liberties to women’s open access to the political decision-making). Ad-
ditionally, the following set of gaps is endogenous to our model: the educational gap,
em/ef, the participation gap, pm/(pf −φn), and the distribution gap which we deﬁne to
be the ratio of individual consumption levels, cm/cf. Note that by expression (8), it is
also measurable by the ratio of the distribution factors, Θ/(1 − Θ). Interestingly, the
above list of gender gap concepts can be re-framed in the four pillars structure of the
Global Gender Gap Indicator. We indeed ﬁnd elements falling into each of the four cat-
egories deﬁned by the World Economic Forum: the ratios wm/wf, pm/(pf − φn) would
pertain to the “economic participation and opportunity” category, the ratio em/ef to the
12“educational attainment” indicator, whereas the “health and survival” is captured by
our pm/pf. Finally, ¯ θ could be classiﬁed in “political empowerment”. While character-
izing the various possible regimes of our model economy, we will pay a special attention
to the relationship between these diﬀerent measures of gender inequalities.
2 The Malthusian Corner Equilibrium
Before deﬁning balanced growth path solutions (BGP), let us characterize the dynamics
of our economy in terms of stationary variables. The stationary variables are deﬁned as:
1+gt =
¯ ht+1
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The stationary variables {θt, ˆ yt,gt,ˆ h
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t,ef,em grow at rate g ∈ R and V grows
at rate (1 − σ)g.
2.1 Exogenous Bargaining Power
Diﬀerent types of dynamic paths are possible, depending on which constraint binds. We






binds with equality, i.e., women spend all their time at having and raising children. We
start by analyzing the simpler case where bargaining power is exogenous, i.e. γ = 0
and θt = ¯ θ ∀t ≥ 0. In this case, the only motive to educate children is to provide them
with a higher labor income in the future. When the entire female time endowment is
devoted to childrearing activities, the motive to educate daughters grounded on higher
13labor market returns fades away. In such a world, the incentive to educate girls is much
limited: with human capital not being rewarded on the labor market; its only interest
lies in the increase of the bargaining power of daughters in their future couple. However,
this motive does not weight here since we have assumed that bargaining power is not




and the ﬁrst order condition with respect to the education of the girl (11) holds with
strict inequality.
Let us stress one important diﬀerence with the existing literature. In Becker, Murphy
and Tamura (1990) a poverty trap obtains as the consequence of a threshold eﬀect in
human capital accumulation. By adding a constant term to equation (5), they obtain
an equilibrium with low education and economic stagnation besides the usual sustained
growth equilibrium. Here, the mechanism is diﬀerent: education expenditures on girls
are low because it is not worthwhile to invest in female human capital when women do not
spend time on the labor market (because fertility is maximum). Moreover, as education
expenditures on boys remain positive in this high fertility regime, we obtain sustained
growth driven by male human capital accumulation. In this, our results also depart from
the BMT model where the economy stagnates in the high fertility-low education regime.
We can now characterize the long-run in this case, which we label “Malthusian balanced
growth path”.
Proposition 1 Assume γ = 0. Along a Malthusian balanced growth path where n =

















Proof in appendix B.
The growth rate depends positively on life expectancy of male workers. This is a standard
Ben-Porath (1967) eﬀect where education investment depends positively on the span
during which this investment pays.11 Not surprisingly, growth depends negatively on
11This departs from the neutrality result in Hazan and Zoabi (2006) according to which greater
longevity has no eﬀect on optimal investment in human capital and thereby nor does it have on growth.
The reason we do not ﬁnd such result follows from our speciﬁc functional choice which is such that the
14the cost of education a. It also depends positively on the cost of rearing children. In
countries having higher cost (for example because infant mortality is high), the net
number of children per women is lower, which promotes growth per capita.









This condition is necessary and suﬃcient for the value function to be deﬁned. The
second condition is that fertility is indeed constrained by the biological maximum pf/φ,
i.e. inequality (14) holds strictly. An analysis of these two conditions is detailed in
Appendix C and leads to the following result.















Proof in appendix C.
This inequality deﬁnes a threshold ¯ pf(pm) such that the condition pf < ¯ pf(pm) is a
necessary condition for the Malthusian balanced growth path to exist.12
Four important implications derive from Proposition 2.
• First, low life expectancy for women is associated with the Malthusian regime. If
women have more chances to survive, it is more likely that they would be active
on the labor market, and this makes girls education worthwhile. Hence, high
life expectancy is incompatible with the corner regime, and empowering women
by augmenting their survival probability, pf, i.e. reducing the survival gap, is
promising to escape from the Malthusian regime.
• Second, lowering the cost of children, for example by reducing children mortality,
may also help to escape from the Malthusian regime. Shortening the time needed
to raise one living child also increases women presence on the labor market and
the return to girls’ education. Hence, active implementation of policy measures
condition of homothetic preferences of parents with respect to the number and the level of education of
their children required to obtain the neutrality result does not hold in our model.
12Notice that the function ¯ pf(pm) is decreasing in pm under Assumption 1 as it implies the inequality
on parameters 1 − δ(1 − σ) > ǫ to be satisﬁed.
15aiming at reducing the total parental time requirement per living child are to serve
countries trapped in a Malthusian regime.
• Third, we observe that female wage, wf, does not intervene in these conditions.
Since women do not participate to the labor market, the possible wage they could
earn is irrelevant. Acting on the wage gap is of no help.
• At last, the parameter driving societal and institutional gender equality ¯ θ does
not appear in the above condition. From this, we may conclude that, in the event
of initial gender inequality in social institutions, empowering women by reducing
the social and institutional gap ¯ θ toward a balanced level does not allow to escape
from the Malthusian regime. It would only allow women to enjoy a larger share of
household consumption.
2.2 Endogenous Bargaining Power
We now lift the assumption of exogenous bargaining power and readdress the condition
for the Malthusian equilibrium to prevail. With γ  = 0, the bargaining power is a function
of the relative human capital levels of the spouses as described by expression (3). For
the Malthusian BGP to prevail in this context we need the education on girls to be nil,
requiring (11) to hold with strict inequality. Once hf = ef = 0, we are back to the
previous case with exogenous bargaining power as we have from expression (3):
θ = (1 − γ)¯ θ + γ
(hm) 
(hm)  + (hf)  = (1 − γ)¯ θ + γ.
Let us now ﬁnd a condition under which the above is true. For (11) to hold with strict
inequality, a suﬃcient condition is that ∂(1 − θt+1)/∂e
f
t in (13) is equal to zero (recall
that the upper bound on fertility is binding, n = pf/φ). At low level of human capital,
this requirement of a nil eﬀect of education on future bargaining power is satisﬁed under
the following condition.
Proposition 3 If the conditions of Proposition 2 are met in addition to
  > 1/δ,
The Malthusian corner Equilibrium is a balanced growth path of the model with γ > 0.
Proof in Appendix D.
16Stated diﬀerently, when human capital is very low and   > 1/δ, bargaining power is
insensitive to human capital. As a result, ef = 0 in equilibrium as both motive to
educate girls vanishes (no labor market return and no bargaining power distribution
eﬀect). The model becomes thus closer to the unitary model of the family. This latter
seems thus more defendable when it represents economies in the corner regime, than
when in the interior regime.
3 Modern Growth Equilibrium
3.1 Theory with Exogenous Bargaining Power
Carrying out the case with exogenous gender power (θ exogenous; γ = 0 and θt = ¯ θ ≥
0 ∀t), we now focus on the interior regime with positive education on boys and girls (i.e.
regime in which all the expressions in (7) hold as strict inequalities).
Along a balanced growth path, human capital of both men and women grow at the same
rate g. The steady state is a vector {θ, ˆ y,ˆ hf,ˆ hm,g, ˆ V ,ˆ cf,ˆ cm,Θ,ˆ ef,ˆ em,n} satisfying the
system of equations in Appendix E.
We can simplify this system and obtain a balanced growth path characterized by {g,ˆ em,ˆ ef,
n} satisfying:










• The equality between the marginal return and cost of education for boys:
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17• The deﬁnition of the growth rate







We have then the following result.
Proposition 4 Along a balanced growth path in the interior regime, the vector {g,ˆ em,ˆ ef,
n} does not depend on ¯ θ.
The social and institutional gap ¯ θ does not matter for fertility and education decisions,
it only aﬀects the allocation of consumption in the couple. The eﬀect of the other gaps
on the interior BGP unfortunately cannot be assessed in general. Indeed, unlike the
previous case, we cannot obtain closed form solutions. Applying the implicit function
theorem to the system described above to get comparative static results would also
be too much involved. Therefore, in the subsequent subsection, we rely on numerical
simulations to investigate some properties of this equilibrium.
3.2 Additional Results from Numerical Analysis
This section provides a numerical illustration of the model. The simulation exercise
points at evaluating the eﬀect of changes in exogenous variables on the long run interior
equilibrium. Recognizing the enhancing role of the demographic transition toward low
fertility for transition to a modern growth regime central, we will especially look at the
impact of shifts in the exogenous variables on fertility.
Calibration
At this stage, we do not aim at reproducing the demographic transition in a particular
country. The evaluation of the model in terms of its empirical implications using cross-
country data is the object of a subsequent section. Still, we choose parameters so as to
reﬂect realistic values that would characterize a stylized industrialized economy along
its balanced growth path. More speciﬁcally, we proceed in two steps. A ﬁrst set of
parameters and exogenous variables are ﬁxed to keep in line with their accredited values
in the macro literature. The remaining free parameters are then chosen so as to generate
a number of assumptions on empirical moments featuring our benchmark model.
The model is calibrated under the assumption that a period lasts for 30 years. As our
starting set of simulations assumes exogenous intra-household welfare weights, we set
18γ = 0. As a result, the social and institutional parameter ¯ θ strictly determines the
intra-household distribution of power and we ﬁx it to be equal to 0.5. The altruism
elasticity with respect to the number of children embodied in the parameter ǫ is set
equal to 1/3.13 According to our model speciﬁcation, the parameter σ is the inverse of
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. We choose a value of 0.34 for it so that
Assumption 1 holds. Regarding the time cost parameter φ associated to children, we
follow De la Croix and Doepke (2003) and choose φ = 0.075. The parameter a is a scale
parameter used to normalize education expenditures with respect to the production level.
We set a = 0.1. In order to reﬂect the longer life-expectancy of women with respect to
that of men observed in most industrialized countries, we ﬁx pf = 1 and pm = 0.9.
The remaining set of parameters are pinned down by considering the following scenario.
First, we assume identical levels of human capital for men and women. Second, output
growth per capita is set at 1.5 percent per year. To tally with observed fertility rates
close to the replacement level in many industrialized countries, we impose two children
per household. Moreover, the education expenditure-GDP ratio is set at 0.06. The above
set of assumptions enables us to pin down four parameters: the elasticity of education
in human capital production, the female and male wage rates, and the discount factor.
They, respectively, take the following values: δ = 0.444, wf = 5.358, wm = 5.060, and
β = 0.127. The higher wage rate for women is required to obtain equal investment in
human capital despite lower female labor supply.
Simulations results with exogenous bargaining power
The purpose here is to analyze how fertility and other characteristics of the economy
adjust to changes occurring along our various dimensions of gender inequality. More
speciﬁcally, we look at the impact of changes in the female wage rate, and in the female
total time endowment.
First, we consider the impact of changing relative wages by considering improvements
in the female wage rate while keeping that of gender counterpart constant. The results,
displayed in Figure 2, indicate that an upward shift in the wage rate of women relative
to that of men has a fertility moderating eﬀect. Households exploit the rise in the
female labor wage by reducing the number of children, and thereby, freeing up time to
mothers for a larger labor market supply. Education in both gender group increases as
parents substitutes quality for quantity in the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ with respect to
13Doepke (2005) provides a sensitivity analysis of the Barro - Becker model to this parameter.



























Figure 2: Eﬀect of wf on fertility n, Education ef (dash) and em, and growth






















Figure 3: Eﬀect of pf on fertility n, Education ef (dash) and em, and growth
the oﬀspring. However, the increase is much steeper for girls due to the improved labor
market return on the investment in female human capital. Lower fertility and higher
education have an enhancing eﬀect on growth.
The next numerical exercise evaluates the eﬀect of a improvement in the female life
expectancy. As depicted in Figure 3, a positive link with both the demand for children
and the girl’s education obtains. With a longer time span, women can have more children
along with an extended labor supply. The latter in turn promotes the labor market
reward on girl’s education spending. Conversely, parents reduce the amount of education
spending on boys with as result a female-to-male catching-up. Finally, observe that
improvements in female longevity has a positive eﬀect on growth through its impact
on the female labor supply. There is however a turning point beyond which the higher
fertility eﬀect overrides the labor market eﬀect and by that reduces growth.14
14A similar hump-shaped pattern is obtained without exogenous fertility in Boucekkine, de la Croix
and Licandro, 2002).
20Before closing this section, it is worth commenting on the impact of choosing diﬀerent
values for the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in the utility function. Indeed,
the parameter σ aﬀects the intra-household distribution of consumption. To see this,
reconsidering it as a measure of risk aversion might be enlightening. A higher σ or
a higher coeﬃcient of risk aversion implies a willingness to distribute resources more
equally between the spouses. Indeed, recall from equation (9) that the eﬀective intra-
household distribution depends on the value of σ. A smaller σ exacerbates the imbalance
in the intra-household distribution of resources between the spouses. In our numerical
illustration, letting ¯ θ evolves from 0.45 to 0.55 has diﬀerent implications for the eﬀective
intra-household distribution, Θ, whether σ = 0.34 or σ = 0.5. In the former case, Θ
ranges from 0.35 to 0.64, while in the latter case, Θ evolves in a narrower band, from
0.40 to 0.60. That is, in the σ = 0.5 case, intra-household distribution of consumption
is less unequal compared to the benchmark case with σ = 0.34. Beside aﬀecting the
intra-temporal allocation of resources, the parameter σ also aﬀect the inter-temporal
allocation of resources.
Figure 4 contrasts simulations results for the cases σ = 0.34 and σ = 0.5. For instance,
we can see in the left panel that setting σ = 0.50 exacerbates the impact of a change in
the female wage rate on fertility: when the wage rate is set to vary from 0.9 percentage
points to 1.1 percentage points of its initial value, the fertility drop is much sharper
in the σ = 0.5 case. Even more compelling are the diﬀerent fertility response patterns
to improving female longevity depending on the value of σ. The income eﬀect in the
demand for children dominates when the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is large
(σ = 0.34). Contrastingly, when the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is low
(σ = 0.5), the demand for children ﬁrst decreases and then shifts upwards. The initial
decrease results from the fact that parents choose to increase the amount of education
on girls substantially, which in turn augments the opportunity cost of having children.
After some threshold, the income eﬀect overrides the substitution eﬀect in the demand
for children and fertility starts swelling.
Simulations results with endogenous bargaining power
Proceeding to the numerical evaluation of the model with endogenous gender power
requires us to revise the parametrization. This is done by dropping the assumption
of γ = 0 and setting γ = 0.1 instead (a conservative value not to overestimate the
eﬀect of endogenous bargaining power). Recall from expression 3 that parameter   is a
sensitivity measure of the bargaining power distribution with respect to relative human















Figure 4: Eﬀects of wf and pf on fertility for σ = 0.34 (solid) and σ = 0.5 (dash)
capital. We set this parameter to be equal to 2. Given these changes, we obtain new
calibrated values for the female and male wage rates (wf = 6.183 and wm = 5.839)
and for the elasticity of education (δ = 0.388). The discount factor remains unchanged
(β = 0.127).
From a theoretical perspective, the main eﬀect of adding the endogenous bargaining
power speciﬁcation in the model is to introduce a further motive to educate children
in the head of parents: besides the traditional labor market return on the investment
in human capital, parents now also ascribe to it an “intra-household market return”
formulated in terms of enhanced intra-household bargaining power.
This eﬀect is distinctly evidenced in our ﬁrst next numerical experiment in which an
increase in the social and institutional parameter ¯ θ is considered. With this parameter
capturing the exogenous dimensions of bargaining power determination, the experiment
amounts at analyzing a favorable exogenous shift in the bargaining power of men (see
equation (3)). Figure 5 depicts the shifts in the equilibrium values of the model variable
following an increase of ¯ θ from to 0.45 to 0.55. Highly noteworthy are the educational
gender gap overturn and the fertility increase. Subsequently to an exogenous ameliora-
tion of the bargaining position of men, parents take to augment education spending on
boys in order to grasp their future utility gain associated to it. However, this is done
to the detriment of girls education and, as a result of the impaired labor market return
associated to lower female human capital, households choose to increase the number of
children and to reduce the labor market time of women. These shifts are negative for
growth.
Hereunder, two additional numerical experiments are considered. We ﬁrst consider the
impact of an increase in the female wage rate on the equilibrium values of the model
























Figure 5: Eﬀect of ¯ θ on fertility n, Education ef (dash) and em, and growth
variable. The shifts in variable show similar directions with respect to our previous
analogous experiment in the θ exogenous case. We again ﬁnd that an improvement in
the female wage rate leads to a lower number of children per household who however get
more education on average, as well as to a stronger growth rate. In our last numerical
experiment, we assess the impact of an improvement in the female life expectancy on
the benchmark model equilibrium when θ is endogenously determined. Consistently
with the exogenous bargaining case, we ﬁnd that fertility increases, the education gap
decreases, and growth fasten.
Hence, contrary to the exogenous bargaining case, we ﬁnd that a move of the social and
institutional gap ¯ θ in favor of women incites parents to invest in girls’ education, which
leads to a reduction in fertility and promotes growth. The other comparative static
results are not much aﬀected by the endogeneity of bargaining power.
4 Empirical Analysis
A number of predictions are obtained from the above theoretical model. Economies can
be in a Malthusian corner regime with high gender inequality in education and high
fertility or in an interior regime. The conditions to be in either regime depend on model
parameter values like pf (women life expectancy) and φ (child rearing time cost). In the
Malthusian regime, fertility is perfectly correlated with maximum fertility pf/φ. Neither
a narrower social and institutional gap nor a higher wage of women (closing the wage gap)
aﬀect fertility in this regime. On the contrary, in the interior regime, countries with more
social and institutional gender parity and/or with more balanced wages should display
lower fertility and faster growth. In this section we take up evaluating empirically the
23pertinence of the model using cross-country data. The main data sources are brieﬂy
outlined and a description of the empirical strategy and associated results follows.
4.1 Data
This study examines the relationship between gender equality in its various dimensions
and fertility for a sample of 157 countries. The data used are listed in Appendix F.
Unless stated otherwise, data refer to the year 2005. Country speciﬁc fertility rates are
computed from data on number of births per women published by the World Bank in its
World Development Indicators. This same source of information provides us with a ﬁrst
indicator on education gender gap by country. It is measured as the girls-to-boys primary
completion ratio. As a second indicator, we refer to the Global Gender Gap educational
attainment subindex 2007 compiled by the World Economic Forum. It is obtained as a
weighted combination of the ratios of women-to-men enrolment in primary-, secondary-,
and tertiary-level education and of the women-to-men adult literacy rates. Wherever
needed in our computations, survival probabilities are from life tables downloaded from
the World Health Organization’s website.
4.2 Methodology, Cross-country evidence and related results
The maximum net fertility rate
It is shown in Section 2 that a low female survival probability as well as an extensive
ﬁxed time cost per surviving child, possibly due to high infant mortality, are more likely
to be archetypal of countries trapped in the Malthusian regime. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne
the maximum net fertility rate that captures the maximum number of living children a
women consistently can have over her entire fecund life-span. This concept of maximum
net fertility is contingent upon the overall health condition in a society: in a country
with high infant mortality and short fecund reproductive period for women (due to low
female life expectancy for instance), the maximum number of surviving children that a
woman can possibly give birth to will be smaller compared to that in a country that does
not confront such sharp problems of infant and adult mortality. From this, we deﬁne,
country by country, an upper frontier on the maximum number of living children per
woman and we then gauge how close to this frontier is the observed number of children
per woman. For ease of exposition, we henceforth term the diﬀerence between maximum
net fertility and actual fertility, the “fertility margin”. Consequently, a country which
24has a fertility margin approaching zero is a country in which observed fertility is high
given the overall prevailing health and survival conditions.
Getting to the speciﬁcs of the evaluation approach, we assume that the adult period
lasts for 20 years. The maximum net fertility is computed as the ratio of the expected
numbers of years a 20-years-old woman will live over a 20 years long period (pf in our
model) over the total time cost associated to every surviving child (φ in the model).






[a/(1 − IMR)] + b
, (15)
where L20f and L40f represent the proportion of women surviving to age 20 and 40
respectively. Hence, the distance ratio L40f/L20f produces the fraction of 20 years old
women that eﬀectively reach the age of 40. Multiplying this ﬁgure by 20 produces the
average number of years a women entering adulthood may expect to live.
The denominator captures the net parental time cost per surviving children with low-
ercase a standing for the fraction of time spent by a mother at raising each newborn
child during her ﬁrst year of life and b representing the additional time cost associated
to surviving children. The term 1 − IRM is the proportion of newborns that survive
the ﬁrst year of life. Infant mortality rates are directly available from survival table.
To ﬁx the value of parameters a and b, we follow the methodology presented in Bar
and Leukhina (2008). The authors introduce the ratio of the total parental time cost of
a surviving child over that of a non surviving child and set it to be equal to four, i.e.






forms a system that can be solve for a and b. In order to do so, we set IMR = 0.04
(sample average). In addition, referent to the discussion in De la Croix and Doepke
(2003), it is supposed that the opportunity cost of a child is equivalent to about 15
percent of the mother’s total time endowment and that children live with parents for 15
years. This allows us to set φ = 0.15 ∗ 15 = 2.25. This given, we obtain a = 0.5567 for
the time cost per newborn child, and b = 1.6701 as the additional cost per children that
eﬀectively reach adult age. By way of example, Table 2 reports the computational steps
of the maximum net fertility for the countries of Iran, Mexico and Mozambique.
15See Bar and Leukhina (2008) for a detailed explanation on the calibration strategy of this ratio.
It is done by using the data on age-speciﬁc mortality and the assumption that the instantaneous cost
function of raising a child is a decreasing linear function of the childs age.
25L20f L40f pf 1-IMR φ ¯ n n ¯ n − n ef/em
Iran 0.96 0.94 19.58 0.97 2.27 8.63 2.00 6.56 0.96
Mexico 0.97 0.96 19.70 0.98 2.26 8.70 2.06 6.60 0.99
Mozambique 0.83 0.55 13.30 0.90 2.31 5,75 4.77 0.45 0.75
Table 2: Maximun Net Fertility: Iran, Mexico and Mozambique
Figure 6: The fertility margin : Cross-Country Data
We see that, given the parameter choice and the countries’ data on survival rates, a
woman devoting all her time at raising children could have over 8 living children in Iran
and Mexico but only somewhat fewer than 6 children in Mozambique. In the next to
last column, we report the fertility margin, ¯ n−n, with n being the observed number of
living children per women. It is computed as the number of birth per women form the
World Development Indicators adjusted for the infant mortality rate associated to ﬁrst
year of life.
Interestingly, Mozambique is the country for which the distance between actual fertil-
ity and maximum net fertility rates is the tiniest. That is, despite having the lowest
maximum net fertility, due to the low female survival rate and the high cost of having
living children, Mozambique has the highest fertility rate out of the three countries. As
a result, we can say that this country has a fertility rate that is bigger both in absolute
and relative terms (i.e. in distance terms). Contrastingly, compared to Iran, Mexico
presents a larger fertility rate in absolute terms but in relative terms, fertility is smaller
26(the fertility margin is larger).
Figure 6 displays the fertility margin for our list of countries sorted in ascending order
along the maximum net fertility variable. As we move from left to right along the
x-axis, maximum net fertility and observed number of living births per women ﬁrst
increase alongside up to some break point beyond which the distance between the two
variables start to widen. This provides us with a good illustration of what constitutes
the essence of Proposition 2: countries with high infant mortality and low female life
expectancy (resulting in a low maximum net fertility) are more likely to be trapped in
the Malthusian regime. In Figure 6, we indeed observe that those countries with a lower
¯ n also tend to display a smaller fertility margin, ¯ n − n with respect to countries that
enjoy a larger ¯ n due to longer female life expectancy and lower infant mortality rates.
To provide a further evidence that, in countries in the Malthusian regime, fertility is
constrained by the supply side, we categorize countries into Malthusian regimes and
non-Malthusian ones. Fixing our separation criterion to a fertility margin equal to 2
standard deviations, we ﬁnd that 21 countries can be listed in the Malthusian regime
category. In other words, for 21 countries, we observe a diﬀerence between our computed
maximum net fertility variable and eﬀective fertility lower than 2 standard errors. All
other countries present a bigger positive distance between maximum net and eﬀective
fertility. Within the Malthusian regime category, we compute the correlation between
fertility and maximum fertility. It equals 0.85 which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.
Fertility, and gender power
In Table 3, we correlate our measure of fertility margin with distinct measures of the
gender gap. The ﬁrst row shows these correlations for the entire cross-country sample.
In line with a well established result, we observe strong positive relationship between
gender equality in education and low fertility margin.16 Noticeably, fertility margin
relates less strongly to the other dimensions of the gender gap. However, interesting
patterns in these correlations emerge when we consider the two groups of countries. We
observe that in the Malthus group, no correlation is signiﬁcant. This is perfectly in
line with the model, where the fertility margin is always equal zero in this regime. In
the non-Malthus (interior) group of countries, correlations with the various dimensions
are always stronger than in the full sample. Beyond the strong correlation between
the gender gap in education and our measure of fertility margin, we ﬁnd a positive
16See for instance Klasen (2002), and Dollar and Gatti (1999).
27correlation with our two measures of women political power. If we accept them to be
an indicator of the social and institutional gender gap, we may assert that reducing
the gender gap along this dimension would help to fasten the demographic transition.
This concords with our result from Section 3 when bargaining power is endogenous. In
a similar vein, the correlation between fertility margin and the economic participation
and opportunity gender gap index is positive. Considering that the female-to-male wage
gap is an important built-in factor for this gender equality index17, we may allege that
the positive relationship goes in line with our result according to which a lower gender
gap is fertility reducing and growth enhancing for economies in the interior regime (see
Figure 3).
Educational Education Economic particip.
Attainment gap (WDI) and opportunity
All Countries 0.658 (0.00;126) 0.490 (0.00;101) 0.128 (0.15;126)
Malthus 0.048 (0.88;11) 0.136 (0.58;17) 0.174 (0.57;11)
Interior 0.685 (0.00;113) 0.518 (0.00;82) 0.367 (0.00;113)
Political Women in
Empowerment Parliament (U.N.)
All Countries 0.163 (0.07; 126) 0.174 (0.03;157)
Malthus -0.250 (0.41;11) 0.028 (0.90;19)
Interior 0.202 (0.03;113) 0.275 (0.00;136)
p-value and degrees of freedom (N obs-2) between parentheses.
Table 3: Correlations with fertility margin
5 Conclusion
Endorsed by all world’s leading development institutions, the promotion of gender equal-
ity has become a race horse toward sustainable development in all regions of the world.
In spite of the surrounding consensus on the positive link between gender equality and
17In the construction of the “Economic Participation and Opportunity gender equality index”, the
World Economic Forum attributes a weight of 0.310 to the female-over-male wage ratio (for similar
work). The second main component is the ratio of estimated female earned income over male value
with a weight of 0.221. The other factors are the ratio of female labor force participation over male
value, the ratio of female legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers over male; and the ratio of female
professional and technical workers over male value
28economic growth, macroeconomic studies that formally explore the role of gender het-
erogeneity remain relatively sparse. In this paper, we try to formally clarify the part
played by various dimensions to gender inequality in fostering the transition toward
faster growth. Fully recognizing the economic growth enhancing impact of a reduced
population growth, we especially focus on the pathways by which increases in gender
equality may aﬀect fertility.
To this end, we set up an overlapping-generations model with gender heterogeneity,
endogenous fertility, and parental investment in children’s human capital. Distinctive
to our model is the speciﬁcation of a household decision process based on the notion of
intra-household bargaining power. In this setting we are able to identify four dimensions
of gender equality (life expectancy-, wage-, socio-institutional-, and education-based
inequality concepts), and to analyze their impact on both demographic and economic
outcomes.
We ﬁrst characterize two equilibrium regimes: a Malthusian corner regime with low
growth, high fertility and strong gender inequality in education; and an interior growth
regime in which low fertility and a more balanced distribution of education between men
and women prevail.
We next derive the condition to escape the Malthusian regime. Reducing the social and
institutional gender gap in economies trapped in the Malthusian regime does not prove
to be the way out. Nor is lowering the gender wage gap. The key policy measures to
ease out these countries are to promote female longevity and infant survival rates. These
ﬁndings are corroborated in our cross-country data analysis where evidence is found that
countries with high infant mortality and low female life expectancy are more likely to be
trapped in the Malthusian regime. In addition, for countries that we identify as falling in
the “Malthusian regime” category, the distance between maximum and observed fertility
exhibits weak correlations with the various dimensions of gender equality.
We further our understanding of how fertility and other characteristics of the economy
adjust to changes in gender equality by proceeding to some numerical simulations of
the benchmark interior regime. When bargaining power is exogenous, augmenting the
female wage rate relative to that of men abates fertility and fosters growth. We also ﬁnd
that improving female life expectancy is positive for growth. When bargaining power
is endogenous, the sole additional result comes with our social and institutional gender
gap: the implementation of policy measures aiming at stronger gender parity in the
social and institutional set-up of a given economy in the interior regime will promote
economic growth by lowering the population growth rate.
29Let us close by insisting on the fact that, as unsettling as may sound our result according
to which reducing the social and institutional is of no immediate help to escape the high
fertility regime in low income countries, we do not discard the importance of achieving
gender parity. To start with, it is certainly a worthy objective in itself. More work needs
to be done in order to obtain a clear understanding of the mechanisms linking gender
equality and economic growth. The present work is one step ahead in this direction.
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31B Malthusian Growth Rate - Proposition 1
In deriving the expression for the Malthusian growth rate, 1+gM, we ﬁrst use (18) and
(19) with ˆ hf = 0 so as to express education expenditures on boys in eﬃcient form as a








The growth rate in the Malthusian equilibrium is then derived from the optimality
condition with respect to the education of the boys (24). Bear in mind that the ﬁrst
term in the RHS brackets of this condition vanishes as γ = 0 (implying ∂Θt+1/∂em
t = 0)
in this regime. Hence, we may write,
θanǫ














δ, the expression for the Malthusian growth rate

















C Thresholds Determination - Proposition 2
We next direct our analysis on the conditions for such an equilibrium to arise.
First, the inequality 1 > 1
2 βn1−ǫ(1 + gM)1−σ is required to hold in order to obtain a





































This deﬁnes a threshold ¯ pf(pm) such that the condition pf < ¯ pf(pm) is a necessary
condition for the Malthusian balanced growth path to exist. ¯ pf(pm) is a decreasing
function of pm assuming 1 − δ(1 − σ) > ǫ, which always holds under Assumption 1.
Second, as, in the Malthusian equilibrium, the upper bounds on the maximum number
32of children is achieved, n = pf/φ, the optimality condition with respect to the number



























Knowing that ˆ hm = 2 from (19), income can be derived from (17) as







with n = pf/φ. Next, substitute into the expression of ˆ V the individual demands for
private consumption expressed in terms of the net income, ˆ yt, given by (21)-(22). The






















k = (1 − θ)(1 − Θ)
1−σ + θΘ
1−σ.
Substituting this result into the optimality condition with respect to the number of
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θ = 1 leads us to conclude that it equals 1. Since the inequality
1 > 1
2βn1−ǫ(1+gM)1−σ is required to hold in order to obtain a ﬁnite objective function,

























33Rearranging terms further leads to:
4pmwm
a n ˆ em >




Replacing ˆ em by its value
22− 1
δpmwm




2(1 − σ)((1 + gM)σ−1nǫ−1 − β/2)
(1 − ǫ)β
+ 1





. We can then express the growth rate in
terms of the following product:
1 + g












































































































⇔ Z ((1 − ǫ) − δ(1 − σ)) >
βδ
2
((1 − ǫ) − (1 − σ)).





(1 − ǫ) − (1 − σ)
(1 − ǫ) − δ(1 − σ)
 
. (29)
It is easy to show that the above condition is always satisﬁed given our inequality
requirement such that 1 >
1
2 βn1−ǫ(1 + gM)1−σ that ensures a ﬁnite objective function.
































(1 − ǫ) − (1 − σ)
(1 − ǫ) − δ(1 − σ)
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and, as a direct result, we may conclude that whenever inequality (30) is satisﬁed,
equation (29) holds true as well.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Writing down the ﬁrst derivative of the bargaining power variable with respect to educa-























35Clearly this expression is equal to zero whenever  δ − 1 > 0. Hence  δ − 1 > 0 is
suﬃcient to have ef = 0, which in turn implies exogenous bargaining power.
E Interior BGP with Exogenous Bargaining Power
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m = 2,











1−σ ˆ V ,
ˆ c
m = Θˆ y,
ˆ c
f = (1 − Θ)ˆ y,
Θ =
θ1/σ
θ1/σ + (1 − θ)1/σ,
an




























36L1 L20 L40 Max Birth Net birth Fertility Malthus girls/ boys parliamentary Economic Educ. Health Political
females females net per per margin regime Primary seats occup. Particip. Attain- and Empow-
Country fertility woman woman Complet. by women % & Opport. -ment Survival -erment
World Health Organization Eq.(15) WDI Our computations WDI U.N. World Economic Forum
Swaziland 89555 81800 37758 4.03 3.91 3.50 0.53 1 1.06 7.76
Zimbabwe 93987 89262 43942 4.35 3.34 3.14 1.21 1 0.95 14.40 0.604 0.925 0.952 0.105
Botswana 91434 85914 46128 4.71 3.03 2.77 1.94 1 9.42 0.640 0.998 0.953 0.129
Lesotho 89834 85178 46185 4.74 3.40 3.05 1.68 1 1.37 11.34 0.661 1.000 0.980 0.190
Zambia 89626 78337 46010 5.13 5.40 4.84 0.29 1 0.81 11.14 0.571 0.848 0.961 0.135
Malawi 92156 84640 55900 5.81 5.84 5.38 0.43 1 0.94 11.32 0.675 0.865 0.961 0.090
Mozambique 89996 82949 55164 5.81 5.30 4.77 1.04 1 0.66 29.96 0.797 0.752 0.978 0.226
Central African R. 88460 77387 52196 5.87 4.73 4.18 1.68 1 0.57 8.13
Angola 84615 69916 53036 6.52 6.56 5.55 0.97 1 14.20 0.585 0.779 0.980 0.070
Sierra Leone 83491 66419 51071 6.58 6.48 5.41 1.17 1 12.63
Kenya 92167 86349 64952 6.62 4.98 4.59 2.03 1 0.97 5.66 0.649 0.934 0.968 0.053
Niger 84993 67741 53223 6.76 7.67 6.52 0.24 1 0.67 7.35
Tanzania 92429 83740 64580 6.79 5.20 4.81 1.98 1 1.01 21.68 0.780 0.859 0.969 0.180
Rwanda 88177 75770 60670 6.96 5.80 5.11 1.84 1 0.93 36.16
Equatorial Guinea 87686 76066 61565 7.02 5.89 5.16 1.86 1 0.85 13.20
Uganda 92063 83260 66927 7.07 7.10 6.54 0.53 1 0.86 23.52 0.676 0.874 0.976 0.207
Guinea-Bissau 87602 76769 62687 7.08 7.08 6.20 0.88 1 0.56 12.00
Burundi 88588 77296 63517 7.15 6.80 6.02 1.13 1 0.77 21.38
Nigeria 89918 76981 63028 7.15 5.70 5.13 2.03 1 0.83 6.13 0.621 0.808 0.969 0.052
Congo, Democratic R. 92057 87101 71300 7.20 6.70 6.17 1.03 1 0.67 8.10
Chad 87580 75209 62506 7.21 6.30 5.52 1.69 1 0.46 7.50 0.652 0.470 0.976 0.054
Mali 87968 74634 62128 7.23 6.72 5.91 1.32 1 0.65 8.84 0.695 0.652 0.969 0.091
Namibia 95390 93106 60821 5.80 3.66 3.49 2.31 0 1.12 23.98 0.672 0.993 0.968 0.172
South Africa 94923 91305 63410 6.16 2.78 2.64 3.52 0 1.03 30.76 0.586 0.991 0.975 0.326
Cte d’Ivoire 88161 80007 60586 6.58 4.70 4.14 2.44 0 0.64 7.90
Afghanistan 83498 68111 55158 6.93 6.93 0 0.39 27.15
Cameroon 91273 82767 65486 6.94 5.00 4.56 2.38 0 0.87 8.98 0.511 0.826 0.969 0.061
Gabon 94084 90272 72948 7.15 3.73 3.51 3.64 0 1.04 9.04
Burkina Faso 90358 76858 64916 7.39 5.90 5.33 2.06 0 0.73 9.54 0.631 0.680 0.970 0.084
Benin 91090 81776 70462 7.55 5.60 5.10 2.45 0 0.59 7.24 0.543 0.658 0.975 0.086
Haiti 91681 85712 73746 7.56 3.75 3.44 4.12 0 3.60
Ethiopia 89107 81621 70824 7.56 5.32 4.74 2.82 0 11.78 0.585 0.740 0.969 0.102
Djibouti 91200 84729 73610 7.62 4.74 4.32 3.30 0 0.72 6.56
Togo 92170 84671 73395 7.62 5.03 4.64 2.99 0 0.67 6.40
Guinea 90214 82506 72676 7.70 5.60 5.05 2.65 0 0.60 14.66
Gambia, The 90344 84506 75416 7.81 4.40 3.98 3.83 0 9.30 0.687 0.808 0.980 0.094
Ghana 93205 86636 76715 7.81 4.06 3.78 4.03 0 0.94 9.78 0.781 0.871 0.967 0.071
Cambodia 90215 84435 75424 7.81 3.89 3.51 4.30 0 0.88 8.76 0.664 0.845 0.980 0.053
Senegal 92292 84196 76237 7.97 4.90 4.52 3.44 0 0.81 16.24
Eritrea 95031 91232 82345 8.00 5.24 4.98 3.02 0 0.75 20.40
Sudan 93792 89544 81516 8.04 4.15 3.89 4.15 0 0.87 11.14
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Lao 93792 89862 82330 8.09 3.59 3.37 4.73 0 0.88 20.64
Guyana 95300 92118 84164 8.11 2.18 2.08 6.03 0 0.95 23.56
Mauritania 92213 86119 79397 8.11 5.59 5.15 2.95 0 0.90 6.50 0.505 0.832 0.980 0.092
Nepal 94376 89729 82628 8.15 3.46 3.27 4.88 0 0.83 8.73 0.457 0.734 0.955 0.085
Myanmar 92591 88851 82378 8.16 2.23 2.06 6.10 0 1.00
Madagascar 92598 86321 80399 8.20 5.04 4.67 3.53 0 1.02 5.98 0.609 0.958 0.980 0.038
S˜ ao Tom´ e and Pr´ ıncipe 92502 86290 80606 8.22 3.76 3.48 4.75 0 1.09 7.86
Bangladesh 94601 90884 84642 8.25 2.98 2.82 5.43 0 1.06 10.36 0.437 0.871 0.950 0.267
Yemen, R. 92402 88042 82927 8.29 5.87 5.42 2.87 0 0.53 0.46 0.251 0.565 0.980 0.008
Pakistan 92048 87990 83190 8.31 4.12 3.79 4.52 0 13.66 0.372 0.734 0.950 0.148
India 94399 90108 84886 8.34 2.84 2.68 5.66 0 0.86 8.06 0.398 0.819 0.931 0.227
Comoros 94696 92041 88115 8.48 3.76 3.56 4.92 0 0.91 2.00
Bolivia 94801 92162 88242 8.48 3.65 3.46 5.02 0 0.95 15.18 0.607 0.968 0.967 0.087
Thailand 98202 97037 92539 8.53 1.89 1.86 6.67 0 0.98 7.50 0.724 0.973 0.980 0.050
Indonesia 97194 95335 91234 8.53 2.27 2.21 6.33 0 1.01 11.33 0.599 0.949 0.972 0.101
Kazakhstan 97331 96583 92423 8.54 1.75 1.70 6.83 0 0.99 10.60 0.737 0.989 0.979 0.089
Turkmenistan 91891 90447 87958 8.55 2.60 2.39 6.16 0 18.80
Honduras 96914 95079 91232 8.55 3.47 3.36 5.19 0 13.68 0.549 1.000 0.980 0.136
Kyrgyz Republic 94196 93223 90209 8.56 2.41 2.27 6.29 0 0.99 4.00 0.653 0.994 0.980 0.035
Guatemala 96793 94567 90881 8.56 4.33 4.19 4.37 0 0.86 9.04 0.471 0.897 0.980 0.110
Tajikistan 94100 92630 89982 8.59 3.53 3.32 5.27 0 0.94 10.90 0.710 0.869 0.979 0.074
Russia 98906 98159 94385 8.61 1.29 1.28 7.34 0 10.56 0.735 0.999 0.979 0.034
Uzbekistan 94276 93874 91390 8.61 2.22 2.09 6.52 0 1.00 10.90 0.754 0.963 0.977 0.075
Philippines 97505 96328 93058 8.62 3.20 3.12 5.50 0 1.08 13.34 0.789 1.000 0.980 0.283
Dominican R. 97402 96553 93323 8.62 2.95 2.87 5.75 0 1.10 16.94 0.585 1.000 0.980 0.117
Mongolia 96083 95296 92619 8.64 2.33 2.24 6.40 0 1.05 6.12 0.668 0.999 0.980 0.046
Suriname 97000 95166 92328 8.65 2.51 2.43 6.21 0 1.16 18.30 0.617 0.989 0.973 0.139
Belize 98500 98005 94742 8.65 2.97 2.93 5.72 0 5.34 0.552 1.000 0.980 0.039
Azerbaijan 92582 90991 89424 8.65 2.33 2.16 6.50 0 0.99 9.46 0.732 0.971 0.926 0.083
Trinidad and Tobago 98300 97784 94731 8.66 1.61 1.58 7.08 0 1.00 17.48 0.639 0.996 0.980 0.130
Fiji 98400 97458 94433 8.67 2.79 2.75 5.92 0 1.02 8.08
Ukraine 98700 98061 95054 8.68 1.20 1.18 7.49 0 6.62 0.708 0.984 0.973 0.050
Nicaragua 97028 95875 93394 8.68 3.08 2.99 5.69 0 1.11 17.34 0.434 0.991 0.976 0.181
Peru 97702 96653 94017 8.69 2.86 2.79 5.89 0 0.98 19.44 0.537 0.976 0.971 0.165
Lebanon 97287 96583 94053 8.69 2.25 2.19 6.50 0 1.04 3.14
Ecuador 97800 96728 94083 8.69 2.67 2.61 6.08 0 1.01 15.60 0.634 0.994 0.980 0.145
Algeria 96602 95350 93042 8.69 2.44 2.36 6.33 0 1.00 5.64 0.464 0.942 0.971 0.049
Jamaica 98319 97489 94834 8.70 2.38 2.34 6.36 0 1.05 12.14 0.701 1.000 0.971 0.098
El Salvador 97694 96839 94377 8.70 2.76 2.70 6.01 0 1.00 14.54 0.576 0.988 0.980 0.197
Egypt 97198 95832 93586 8.71 3.10 3.01 5.70 0 0.95 2.00 0.421 0.909 0.972 0.022
Iran 96884 95817 93789 8.72 2.07 2.01 6.72 0 3.82 0.395 0.958 0.978 0.031
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Brazil 97244 96507 94398 8.72 2.28 2.22 6.51 0 1.01 7.92 0.645 0.969 0.980 0.062
Jordan 97798 96776 94622 8.73 3.29 3.22 5.51 0 1.00 3.70 0.483 0.979 0.971 0.048
Saudi Arabia 97879 96905 94755 8.73 3.83 3.75 4.99 0 0.00 0.321 0.961 0.976 0.000
Turkey 97398 96512 94504 8.74 2.19 2.13 6.60 0 0.90 3.68 0.431 0.854 0.971 0.052
Morocco 96393 95801 94064 8.74 2.40 2.31 6.42 0 6.96 0.401 0.845 0.972 0.053
Belarus 99328 98832 96483 8.75 1.24 1.23 7.52 0 29.03 0.728 0.983 0.979 0.155
Vietnam 98403 97546 95457 8.75 1.78 1.75 7.00 0 0.94 25.06 0.745 0.892 0.970 0.148
Venezuela 98200 97491 95508 8.76 2.65 2.60 6.16 0 1.06 13.20 0.631 0.999 0.980 0.110
Syrian Arab R. 98602 98136 96062 8.76 3.24 3.19 5.57 0 11.20 0.524 0.927 0.976 0.059
Tunisia 97999 97309 95414 8.76 2.04 2.00 6.76 0 16.56 0.474 0.959 0.970 0.110
Albania 98400 97217 95277 8.77 1.78 1.75 7.02 0 1.00 6.22 0.689 0.992 0.955 0.038
China 97688 96298 94623 8.77 1.81 1.77 7.01 0 20.66 0.648 0.957 0.941 0.111
Panama 98100 97190 95412 8.77 2.62 2.57 6.20 0 14.68 0.655 0.994 0.980 0.153
Georgia 95921 95970 94758 8.77 1.39 1.33 7.44 0 8.08 0.630 0.998 0.933 0.104
Moldova 98601 98158 96240 8.77 1.27 1.25 7.52 0 0.99 14.16 0.778 0.994 0.979 0.117
Colombia 98296 97573 95742 8.77 2.40 2.36 6.42 0 1.05 10.75 0.691 1.000 0.980 0.166
Sri Lanka 98802 98289 96347 8.78 1.91 1.89 6.89 0 4.98 0.557 0.990 0.980 0.365
Paraguay 98000 97375 95679 8.78 3.67 3.60 5.18 0 0.59 7.20 0.594 0.945 0.980 0.144
Maldives 96698 95481 94306 8.80 4.00 3.87 4.93 0 8.40 0.514 1.000 0.951 0.075
Mexico 97794 97122 95678 8.80 2.11 2.06 6.73 0 1.01 19.25 0.489 0.992 0.980 0.116
Armenia 97399 97013 95681 8.80 1.37 1.33 7.47 0 1.01 5.10 0.721 0.999 0.923 0.017
Latvia 99201 98685 96917 8.80 1.31 1.30 7.50 0 18.60 0.734 0.986 0.980 0.233
Lithuania 99313 98935 97193 8.81 1.27 1.26 7.55 0 18.60 0.761 0.998 0.979 0.155
Mauritius 98694 98274 96760 8.81 1.98 1.95 6.86 0 10.22 0.547 0.983 0.980 0.085
Malaysia 99000 98399 96860 8.82 2.74 2.71 6.11 0 1.00 8.62 0.567 0.985 0.969 0.056
Argentina 98603 98118 96714 8.82 2.29 2.26 6.56 0 30.80 0.613 0.996 0.980 0.204
Bosnia and Herzegovina 98700 98225 96813 8.82 1.19 1.17 7.65 0 12.93
Romania 98383 97898 96589 8.83 1.32 1.30 7.53 0 0.99 8.84 0.697 0.993 0.979 0.074
Bulgaria 98809 98308 96891 8.83 1.31 1.29 7.53 0 18.82 0.699 0.989 0.979 0.167
Oman 98999 98424 96959 8.83 3.44 3.41 5.42 0 0.98 2.20 0.384 0.971 0.971 0.035
Uruguay 98699 98275 96888 8.83 2.00 1.97 6.85 0 9.03 0.634 0.991 0.980 0.039
Estonia 99448 98898 97443 8.84 1.50 1.49 7.35 0 18.70 0.694 0.999 0.979 0.131
United States 99341 98971 97590 8.84 2.05 2.04 6.81 0 13.84 0.738 0.982 0.979 0.102
Costa Rica 98900 98530 97339 8.85 2.00 1.98 6.87 0 29.12 0.554 0.995 0.980 0.277
Cuba 99476 99070 97838 8.86 1.50 1.49 7.37 0 31.80 0.681 0.990 0.974 0.222
Hungary 99366 99088 97902 8.86 1.32 1.31 7.55 0 1.00 9.88 0.653 0.991 0.979 0.069
Macedonia, FYR 98499 98274 97391 8.87 1.60 1.58 7.29 0 14.25 0.665 0.985 0.963 0.173
Bahrain 99099 98582 97574 8.87 2.34 2.32 6.55 0 1.50 0.390 0.989 0.961 0.031
Chile 99200 98806 97807 8.87 1.97 1.95 6.92 0 12.40 0.517 0.980 0.980 0.116
Korea 99504 99195 98155 8.88 1.08 1.07 7.80 0 1.01 9.08 0.580 0.949 0.967 0.067
Portugal 99635 99239 98179 8.88 1.40 1.39 7.48 0 1.06 16.66 0.684 0.989 0.973 0.138
3
9L1 L20 L40 Max Birth Net birth Fertility Malthus girls/ boys parliamentary Economic Educ. Health Political
females females net per per gap regime Primary seats occup. Particip. Attain- and Empow-
Country fertility woman woman Complet. by women % & Opport. -ment Survival -erment
World Health Organization Eq.(15) WDI Our computations WDI U.N. World Economic Forum
Slovak Republic 99277 98989 98033 8.88 1.25 1.24 7.64 0 1.00 16.60 0.667 0.995 0.980 0.077
United Arab Emirates 99201 98925 97993 8.88 2.43 2.41 6.47 0 5.75 0.421 0.987 0.961 0.105
New Zealand 99466 99088 98093 8.88 2.00 1.99 6.89 0 28.44 0.755 0.999 0.974 0.331
Poland 99355 99047 98120 8.88 1.24 1.23 7.65 0 17.28 0.617 1.000 0.979 0.107
United Kingdom 99502 99246 98291 8.88 1.80 1.79 7.09 0 17.14 0.695 1.000 0.974 0.307
Norway 99686 99332 98399 8.89 1.84 1.83 7.06 0 1.00 37.38 0.751 1.000 0.979 0.494
Belgium 99628 99384 98471 8.89 1.72 1.71 7.18 0 27.94 0.668 1.000 0.979 0.232
France 99628 99398 98490 8.89 1.92 1.91 6.98 0 0.99 10.64 0.646 1.000 0.980 0.104
Finland 99690 99394 98502 8.89 1.80 1.79 7.10 0 1.00 37.70 0.723 0.999 0.980 0.517
Croatia 99436 99128 98302 8.89 1.42 1.41 7.48 0 15.14 0.678 0.989 0.979 0.238
Canada 99505 99256 98415 8.89 1.51 1.50 7.39 0 20.36 0.743 0.999 0.979 0.159
Australia 99491 99242 98413 8.90 1.77 1.76 7.13 0 21.34 0.744 1.000 0.974 0.163
Czech Republic 99654 99365 98511 8.90 1.28 1.28 7.62 0 1.00 14.70 0.630 0.991 0.979 0.088
Iceland 99786 99536 98659 8.90 2.05 2.05 6.85 0 0.98 31.26 0.721 0.987 0.970 0.456
Kuwait 99034 98528 97846 8.90 2.39 2.37 6.53 0 0.90 0.604 0.989 0.961 0.010
Denmark 99590 99349 98529 8.90 1.80 1.79 7.11 0 1.00 36.38 0.734 1.000 0.970 0.305
Slovenia 99666 99394 98556 8.90 1.23 1.23 7.67 0 11.64 0.705 0.999 0.973 0.060
Greece 99617 99292 98468 8.90 1.28 1.28 7.62 0 0.99 10.40 0.630 0.989 0.979 0.061
Netherlands 99564 99355 98544 8.90 1.73 1.72 7.18 0 0.99 35.54 0.667 0.993 0.974 0.319
Ireland 99602 99252 98433 8.90 1.88 1.87 7.03 0 1.01 12.86 0.667 1.000 0.973 0.343
Qatar 98976 98607 97975 8.90 2.89 2.86 6.04 0 0.00 0.456 0.993 0.947 0.021
Japan 99722 99483 98661 8.90 1.26 1.26 7.64 0 6.00 0.549 0.986 0.979 0.067
Austria 99587 99293 98521 8.90 1.41 1.40 7.50 0 0.99 29.98 0.582 0.980 0.980 0.282
Luxembourg 99580 99391 98632 8.90 1.70 1.69 7.21 0 1.05 20.66 0.606 1.000 0.973 0.135
Switzerland 99578 99369 98614 8.90 1.42 1.41 7.49 0 1.02 22.80 0.676 0.957 0.978 0.158
Cyprus 99647 99474 98709 8.90 1.42 1.41 7.49 0 9.66 0.602 0.989 0.966 0.052
Malta 99472 99288 98569 8.90 1.37 1.36 7.54 0 7.64 0.549 0.998 0.974 0.126
Spain 99622 99376 98627 8.91 1.33 1.32 7.58 0 0.99 29.20 0.589 0.994 0.973 0.421
Israel 99568 99303 98581 8.91 2.82 2.81 6.10 0 12.84 0.671 0.995 0.970 0.150
Germany 99614 99387 98664 8.91 1.36 1.35 7.55 0 1.00 30.56 0.700 0.995 0.978 0.374
Italy 99630 99414 98726 8.91 1.32 1.32 7.60 0 1.00 14.46 0.543 0.997 0.972 0.087
Singapore 99755 99538 98822 8.91 1.24 1.24 7.67 0 14.04 0.655 0.931 0.958 0.101
Sweden 99696 99480 98829 8.92 1.77 1.76 7.15 0 44.06 0.761 0.999 0.974 0.525
Iraq 100000 100000 100000 8.98 5.37 5.37 3.61 0 0.76 17.13
Average 95861 92832 86414 8.22 3.03 2.85 5.38 0.14 0.92 13.92 0.616 0.943 0.972 0.138
Std 4066 7974 15444 1.02 1.64 1.42 2.20 0.35 0.16 8.81 0.110 0.096 0.011 0.108
Corr with fertility margin:
–Whole sample 1.00 0.490 0.174 0.128 0.658 0.095 0.163
–Malthus regime 1.00 0.136 0.028 0.174 0.048 0.010 -0.250
– Interior regime 1.00 0.518 0.275 0.367 0.685 0.039 0.202
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